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We assess quantitatively the effect of exogenous reductions in fertility on output per capita. Our simulation
model allows for effects that run through schooling, the size and age structure of the population, capital
accumulation, parental time input into child-rearing, and crowding of fixed natural resources. The
model is parameterized using a combination of microeconomic estimates, data on demographics and
natural resource income in developing countries, and standard components of quantitative macroeconomic
theory. We apply the model to examine the effect of an intervention that immediately reduces TFR
by 1.0, using current Nigerian vital rates as a baseline. For a base case set of parameters, we find that
an immediate decline in the TFR of 1.0 will raise output per capita by approximately 13.2 percent
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Our goal in this research is to quantitatively analyze the economic eects of interventions
that reduce fertility in a developing country. Concretely, we ask how economic measures
such as GDP per capita would compare in the case where some exogenous change reduces
fertility to the case where no such exogenous change takes place. The answer to this question
will be very dierent from simply observing the natural coevolution of fertility and economic
development.
How declining fertility aects economic growth is a old question, going back at least
to Malthus. The modern setting of the problem was posed by Coale and Hoover some 50
years ago. Over the last half century, the consensus view has shifted from fertility declines
having strong eects, to their not being very important, and recently back toward assigning
them some signicance (Sindig, 2009; Das Gupta et al., 2011).
For an issue of that has been studied for so long, and with such potential import,
the base of evidence regarding the economic eects of population growth is rather weak.
In some ways, this should not be a surprise. Population growth changes endogenously as
an economy develops. Thus, at the macroeconomic level, it is very hard to sort out the
direct eects of population growth from those of other factors. Also, the lags at which
population aects economic outcomes may be fairly long. Much of the current thinking
about the eects of fertility decline relies on results from cross-country regressions in which
the dependent variable is growth of GDP per capita and the independent variables include
measures of fertility and mortality, or else measures of the age structure of the population
(Kelley and Schmidt, 2007). Unfortunately, because of problems of omitted variables and
reverse causation, the ability to draw inferences from the conditional correlations in these
regressions is very weak (see Deaton (1999) for a critique).
While cross-country regressions suer from severe econometric problems, they do have
the advantage { if one is interested in studying the aggregate eects of fertility decline { of
focusing on the right dependent variable. By contrast, a good many microeconomic studies
examine the link between fertility at the household level and various outcomes for individuals
in that household (for example, wages, labor force participation, education, etc.). These
studies cannot directly answer the question of how fertility reduction aects the aggregate
economy for three reasons. First, many of the eects of such reduction run through channels
external to the household { either via externalities in the classic economic sense (for example,
environmental degradation) or through changes in market prices, such as wages, land rents,
and returns to capital. Second, even ignoring the issues of external eects, aggregating the
dierent channels by which fertility aects economic outcomes is not trivial. Finally, as in
2the macroeconomic literature, the long time horizon over which the eects of fertility change
will aect the economy limits the ability of a single study to capture them.
In this research we pursue a \third way" in examining the link from fertility decline
to aggregate economic growth. In particular, we build up a macro estimate starting from
microeconomic evidence on the eect of fertility decline, using economic theory to guide us in
putting together the dierent channels by which fertility reduction works, both internal and
external to the household. More specically, we build a simulation model that takes proper
account of both general equilibrium eects and the dynamic evolution of population age
structure, capital accumulation, resource depletion, and so on. Throughout the research,
the focus will be on giving a quantitative analysis of changes in fertility, so that we can
estimate how much extra output a given intervention (for example, a drop in the TFR by
1, or a shift from the UN medium to low fertility projection) will produce over a specic
time period. We hope, by showing how behavioral eects that are often studied in isolation
can be integrated to answer macroeconomic questions, to reorient the academic discussion
of population and development along more quantitative and practical lines.1
There are several advantages to this approach. The simulation-based methodology
allows us to take into account both general equilibrium eects and the dynamic eect of
fertility reductions through channels including the evolution of the size and age structure of
the population, accumulation of physical and human capital, and resource crowding. As will
be seen below, in the case of many of the channels by which fertility aects macroeconomic
outcomes that we consider, it is relatively easy to calculate the steady-state eect of a
1In its analysis of outcomes in dierent demographic scenarios, our model resembles the RAPID model
(see Abel, 1999). On the demographic side, the models are similar. The economic aspects, however, are
completely dierent. In the RAPID model, the path of total GDP in a country is held xed as dierent
demographic scenarios are considered. Thus, for example, a halving of population relative to baseline will
mechanically lead to a doubling of income per capita. This approach completely ignores the productive eect
of labor, and it thus leads to an unreasonably large projected impact of demographic change on the standard
of living.
Much more closely related to our paper is the SEDIM model of Sanderson (2004). Like ours, that model
simulates demographic and economic paths. The biggest dierence between SEDIM and our model is in the
calibration of key parameters. As discussed below, we rely on formal microeconomic estimates to supply the
key parameters of our model, including the eects of education and experience on labor eciency, the eect
of fertility on education and labor supply, and so on. By contrast, the SEDIM model takes a much more
ad hoc approach. Also, the SEDIM model has no land or xed resources, and so the Malthusian eect of
population increase is ignored. Finally, the SEDIM model allows for fertility and education to endogenously
respond to changes in education (although, again, in an ad hoc fashion), while our model takes these variables
as fully exogenous.
Young (2005) simulates the eect of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa on per capita income, using a
Solow model somewhat similar to ours. Relative to our work, however, Young is more concerned with long-
run eects whereas we emphasize transition paths. Our methodological approach is also somewhat dierent
from that of Young, in that we rely as heavily as possible on well-identied econometric estimates produced
by other authors, rather than on producing our own estimates.
3fertility reduction analytically. However, the transition period before an economy is well
approximated by this steady state is often many, many decades. Presumably, policy makers
in the real world are interested in outcomes over a shorter time horizon. The simulation
approach also permits analysis of the strength of the various mechanisms at work. The
simulation model that we build is general, but it has characteristics that can be tailored to the
situation of particular countries. In addition to country-specic demographic characteristics
(vital rates, initial age structure), the model can incorporate country-specic measures of
the role of natural resources in aggregate production, the openness of the capital market,
and (in future research, we hope) other institutional characteristics.
This being said, we should be clear that the model we present is not a fully \mi-
cro founded" computable general equilibrium model of the type that is frequently used
by macroeconomists. In such a model, utility maximizing households would be modeled
as continuously reoptimizing their decisions (fertility, child education, consumption, labor
supply) in response to changes in forecast paths of aggregate variables. This would require
explicitly modeling household utility functions, including preferences over child quality and
quantity, as well as budget constraints and credit market constraints faced by households
and rms.2 In our view, economists' current understanding of household decision-making
in developing countries is simply too limited to produce a quantitatively useful model that
incorporated all of these features. Instead, our approach is more reduced form. We take
paths of fertility as fully exogenous, and rely on available literature to inform us about the
relationship between fertility and human capital investment, labor force participation, and
consumption. The reduced form approach allows us to capture what might be called \rst
round" general equilibrium eects, like the changes in capital/labor ratios, human capital
per worker, land/labor ratios, and so on, that result from a change in fertility. However, we
are not able to capture the \second round" of eects, for example, the eect of changes in
wages or returns to human capital on fertility itself. We consider this a reasonable price to
pay in order to achieve tractability.
To reiterate a point made above, our goal in this paper is not to build the best
possible forecast of the actual path of GDP per capita in the countries that we examine.
Rather, our interest is in asking how the forecast path of GDP would change in response
to a change in fertility. That is, we look at GDP per capita in the scenario where fertility
is reduced relative to GDP per capita in an otherwise identical scenario in which fertility is
not reduced. This is precisely the way that economists think about policy experiments. In
carrying out this exercise, of course, we do need to have a baseline scenario from which to
2See, for example, Doepke et al. (2007).
4work. We use a very straightforward baseline in which, for example, productivity growth is
constant and there is no change in mortality. While one might want to consider a dierent
baseline, it is important to note that errors in the baseline forecast that we use will only have
a second-order eect on our estimate of the dierence between the baseline and alternative
scenarios.
It is also important to note the hurdles that stand between a nding that interventions
to reduce fertility raise output per capita (if that is what we nd) and a conclusion that such
interventions would constitute good policy. First, our analysis says nothing at all about the
methods, costs, or welfare implications of such interventions. Second, GDP per capita is not
necessarily the correct welfare criterion. The question of how a social planner should treat
the welfare of people who may not be born as a result of some policy is notoriously dicult
(Razin and Sadka, 1995; Golosov et al., 2007).
Existing literature has discussed a number of channels that lead from demographic
change to economic outcomes. At the risk of some intellectual straight-jacketing, we classify
these eects as follows. The most basic eect of population on output per capita is through
the congestion of xed factors, such as land. We call this the Malthus eect. A second
channel is \capital shallowing" that results from higher growth in the labor force. We call
this the Solow eect. Four channels run through the age structure of the population, which
is a function of past fertility and mortality rates. First, in a high-fertility environment,
a reduction in fertility leads, at least temporarily, to a higher ratio of working-age adults
to dependents. Holding income per worker constant, this mechanically raises income per
capita. We call this the dependency eect. Second, a concentration of population in their
working years may raise national saving, feeding through to higher capital accumulation and
higher output. We call this the life-cycle saving eect. Work by Bloom and Williamson
(1998) on the \demographic dividend" has stressed a combination of the dependency and
life-cycle saving eects. Third, slower population growth shifts the age distribution of the
working-age population itself toward higher ages. In developing countries this increase in
average experience would be expected to raise productivity, even though in more developed
countries the shift into late middle ages might lower productivity. We call this the experience
eect. Fourth, if older workers participate in the labor market at a higher rate than workers
just entering the workforce, the shifting age distribution towards higher ages will lead to
higher overall labor force participation, thereby increasing income per capita. We call this
the life-cycle labor supply eect. Another eect of reduced fertility is to lower the quantity
of adult time that is devoted to child-rearing, freeing up more time for productive labor. We
call this the childcare eect. Reductions in fertility are often associated with an increase in
5parental investment per child. We call this the child-quality eect. Finally, an increase in
the size of the population may raise productivity directly, by allowing for economies of scale,
or may induce technological or institutional change that raises income per capita.3 We call
this the Boserup eect. In this paper, we attempt to quantify the rst eight of these eects
(Malthus, Solow, dependency, life-cycle saving, experience, life-cycle labor supply, childcare,
and child quality).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section Two presents our simple
demographic model, discusses the fertility interventions we model, and shows the dynamic
paths of population size and age structure in response to the intervention. Section Three
presents the economic model and discusses our choice of base case parameters. Section Four
presents simulation results for the base case model, and then discusses the sensitivity of
results to altering our parameter assumptions. Section Five looks more deeply at dierent
choices regarding the investment rate and how they interact with demographic change.
Section Six similarly goes into greater depth regarding assumptions about the role of the
xed factor in production. In Section Seven, we apply our model to consider a dierent
fertility intervention scenario than what we analyze in the rest of the paper: specically,
we look at the dierence in economic outcomes resulting from a shift from the UN medium
fertility scenario to the low fertility scenario in Nigeria. Section Eight concludes.
2 Demographic Model and Fertility Intervention
The demographic part of the model takes age-specic mortality and fertility schedules as
inputs to project the population over time.4 In practice, population is divided into 5-year
age groups, and each time period in our model corresponds to ve years.5
3There may also be a direct eect of the age structure of the population on productivity. See, for example,
Feyrer (2008).
4For simplicity, our demographic projections are performed on a closed, female-only population.
Considering a population of both males and females, however, would not qualitatively alter the results
of our model as long as the sex-ratio-at-birth remains xed over time.






Pb  Nt if t < T
Pa  Nt otherwise,
where Pb and Pa are the n  n projection matrices before and after the shock, N0 > 0 is given, and the
shock period, T, is determined to occur after the pre-shock population has attained a stable age structure
and rate of growth. A population projection matrix is composed of age-specic net maternity rates along
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Figure 1: Female Life Table Survivorship Function, Nigeria 2006
As discussed above, our analysis is focused on considering interventions that alter
the path of fertility from what would occur along some baseline. Our model can be easily
tailored to consider dierent baseline and intervention scenarios. For most of this paper, we
examine simple baseline and intervention scenarios constructed using demographic data from
Nigeria. This simple approach allows us to better understand the timing by which dierent
demographic-economic channels operate. In Section Seven of the paper, we consider a richer
demographic scenario, based on alternative UN population projections for Nigeria.
Our simple baseline and alternative scenarios are built up using current vital rates
from Nigeria. Figure 1 shows the survivorship function implied by the female life table for
Nigeria in 2006.6 The age-specic fertility proles for the baseline case of no intervention,
along with the cases of 1.0 and 0.5 reductions in TFR are shown in Figure 2.7 We use
the current fertility and mortality schedules to construct a stable population, and in the
baseline scenario we assume that fertility and mortality will be constant going forward. The
implied by a projection matrix is given by its largest, real eigenvalue, and the stable age structure by the
corresponding eigenvector.
6This data is obtained from the WHO's Life Tables for WHO Member States, an online repository
accessible at: http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/life tables/life tables.cfm
7The age-specic fertility data for the baseline case of no intervention corresponds to the \medium variant"
prole reported by the UN in World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision for Nigeria in 2005. In the
case of an intervention, this prole is scaled down (proportionally across age groups) according to the size





































































































































































































Figure 4: Population Size Relative to the No-Intervention Baseline
\base case" intervention that we consider is an instantaneous reduction of 1.0 in the TFR. In
addition to this base case, we consider three alternatives: an instantaneous reduction of 0.5
in the TFR, a phased-in reduction in the TFR of 1.0 that takes place in a geometric fashion
over 25 years, and a 15-year phased-in reduction of 0.5 in the TFR (which we discuss later
in the paper).
Figure 3 shows the sizes of the overall population in the baseline scenario of no
intervention, along with the base case intervention and the case of a phased-in intervention
that reduces the TFR by 1.0 over 25 years. Figure 4 depicts the population paths in the
aforementioned intervention scenarios relative to the no-intervention baseline.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show, respectively, the working-age (15-64), young (under 15),
and elderly (65+) fractions of the population, prior to and following an immediate drop in
fertility. In the pre-shock steady state, 55.5 percent of the population is of working age; in
the post-shock steady state, this fraction rises to 59.2 percent. In addition, as discussed by
Bloom and Williamson (1998), a reduction in fertility leads to a period of several decades in













































































































































































































Figure 7: Over-65 Fraction of the Population in the Base Case Intervention
3 Economic Model and its Parameterization
3.1 Production
In our base case model, aggregate production is given by a standard Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function. The factor inputs are land (which we use as a shorthand for all xed factors








where  +   1, X is a xed arbitrary stock of land, and At is productivity.
We assume fairly standard values for factor shares: we set  = 0:3 and  = 0:6,
meaning that the implied share of land is 10 percent. In a later section, we revisit the role
of xed factors of production. We consider the sensitivity of our results to both the share of
land in national income and the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors of
production. We also examine data on natural resource shares of national income.
Productivity grows at an exogenous rate that does not respond to any of the changes
in the model. For convenience, the growth rate is set to equal the stable population growth
rate in the pre-shock period times the share of land, so that income per capita is constant in
the pre-shock steady state. Because all of our results entail a comparison of income in the
11case of a fertility intervention to the case where no intervention takes place, the underlying
rate of technological change is of very little importance.
3.2 Physical Capital Accumulation
In our base case, we handle capital accumulation extremely simply, by making the Solovian
assumption that a xed share of national income is saved in each period. Young (2005)
makes the same assumption in his analysis of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Accordingly, the
stock of capital in period t, Kt, evolves over time according to
Kt+1 = sYt + (1   )Kt,
where s and  are the xed saving and depreciation rates respectively. We assume that the
annual saving rate is 8.55 percent, which corresponds to the investment share of real GDP
reported by the Penn World Table (version 6.3) for Nigeria in 2005. We assign a standard
value to the depreciation rate of 5 percent.
In Section Five, we consider two alternative models of investment. First, we allow
for variable age-specic saving rates, with workers in their prime earning years having a
high saving rate. This introduces an additional channel though which demographic change
aects growth.8 Second, we consider the case of an economy that is fully open to international
capital ows. This shuts o the \Solow" channel by which slower growth of the labor force
raises the level of capital per worker.
3.3 Eective Labor
We model an individual's eective labor as a function of his or her age-specic labor force
participation rate and level of human capital. Human capital, in turn, is a function of his
or her schooling and experience. We assume that human capital inputs of individuals with
dierent characteristics are perfectly substitutable. Thus, the stock of eective labor in












where Ni;t is the number of individuals of age i in the population in period t, LFPRi;t is
their labor force participation rate, and hs
i;t and he
i;t are, respectively, their levels of human
8There is considerable controversy about the applicability of such models to developing countries. See,
for example, Lee et al. (2001) and Deaton (1999).
12capital from schooling and experience. We assume that children enter the labor force at 15
and workers leave the labor force at 65.
We use labor force participation rates from the ILO-LABORSTA database for Nigeria
in 2005 in our no-intervention baseline. Specically, we employ gender- and age-specic
labor force participation rates to construct total labor force participation rates by age, using
the fraction of males and females in each age group as population weights. In our fertility-
intervention scenario, however, we modify the female labor force participation rates to reect
the eect of a decrease in time devoted to child-rearing on total labor supply, as explained
in the subsequent section.
Our treatment of schooling and experience is standard. Years of schooling are aggre-







exp[1S] if S  4
exp[41 + 2(S   4)] if 4 < S  8
exp[41 + 42 + 3(S   8)] if S > 8,
where we use values of 1 = 0:134, 2 = 0:101, and 3 = 0:068, based on Hall and Jones
(1999). The return to schooling will be relevant for the exercises we conduct because
reductions in fertility will raise the average level of schooling.





i;t = exp[(i   15) +  (i   15)
2],
where, based on Bils and Klenow (2000), who provide an estimate of the average return to
experience in a sample of 48 countries, we use a  value of 0.0495 and a value of -0.0007 for
 . Experience will play a role in our simulations because declines in mortality and fertility
will lead to a population with higher average age and thus higher average experience.
We also expect that lower fertility will raise the average level of schooling. Models of
the fertility transition stress the movement of households along a \quality-quantity" frontier
in which investment per child in health and education rises as the number of children falls.
It does not follow from this observation, however, that the change in schooling that would
result from an exogenous change in fertility is the same as the change that would accompany
declining fertility when both measures are evolving endogenously.
To assess the fertility intervention in which we are interested, we use results from Joshi
and Schultz (2007), who analyzed a randomized intervention in Matlab, Bangladesh. Joshi
and Schultz found that a 15 percent reduction in TFR, resulting from the intervention, led to
13an increase of 0.52 years of schooling for males aged 9-14.9 Since our base case intervention
(TFR reduced by 1.0) corresponds to a percentage reduction of 18.8 percent in the TFR for
Nigeria in 2005, the relevant increase in schooling is 0:52  18:8
15:0 = 0:65 years of schooling.
In our simulations, we thus increase schooling by 0.65 years for cohorts in school at
the time of the decrease in fertility. The eect of this rise in schooling on the average level of
human capital will depend on the initial level of schooling because, as discussed above, the
percentage return to schooling falls with the number of years of schooling. In our base case
simulation, we consider the case where initial schooling is between 5 and 8 years, so that the
return to schooling is 10.1 percent per year.
3.4 Childcare Eects on Labor Supply
Raising of children requires a good deal of labor. That labor is spread over many years, and
divided among many individuals, but the largest piece generally comes from the child's
mother. Reduced fertility should thus potentially increase the labor supply of women.
Assigning a quantitative magnitude to this eect is dicult for several reasons.
 There are obviously strong economies of scale in child-rearing. Thus, the time cost of a
rst child is far higher than the marginal time cost of subsequent children. For example,
Tiefenthaler (1997), examining data from Cebu, Philippines, nds that 14 months after
birth, female labor market hours had declined by 39 percent in the case of rst births,
but by only 10 percent if there were already children aged 0-5 in the household. If
there were both children aged 0-5 and children aged 6-17 in the household, female
labor market hours were actually slightly increased 14 months following a birth.
 Not all time spent on children is subtracted from production. A good part of time
devoted to child-rearing may be at the expense of leisure or, in the case of siblings,
human capital investment (which is not counted as part of national income).
 Child-rearing is often combined with productive activities, especially in developing
countries. For example, a woman may carry a baby in a sling or watch children out of
the corner of her eye while she works at a productive task. The \cost" of child-rearing
in terms of productive labor in this case would only be the decrement in productivity
that results from such multitasking.
9This coecient of 0.52 is derived from Table 9, Column 2 in their paper. They report a standardized
beta of 0.54 to which we apply the standard deviation for years of schooling of 0.95 from their summary
statistics.
14Despite these caveats, the time cost of child-rearing may still be a signicant compo-
nent in the economic response to fertility decline. We measure the eect of fertility change on
labor supply through the childcare channel by specifying a parameter we call the labor market
time cost of a marginal child. Summarizing all these considerations in a single parameter
is obviously too simplistic { but, in doing so, we at least have a concrete measure that can
be implemented in our model. Specifying the time cost of the marginal child might also be
considered problematic because the marginal cost would be expected to fall with the number
of children. However, for the experiments we are considering, the TFR remains above two,
often by a good amount. Thus, we are only considering the marginal cost of third and higher
parity children, where we would not expect the decline in marginal cost to be so extreme.
This matches the ndings of Holmes and Tiefenthaler (1997), who conclude the that the
marginal time cost of children is roughly constant for the third and higher children.10
Mechanically, we implement the childcare eect by increasing female labor force
participation in each year by the hypothesized change in age-specic fertility multiplied by
the labor market time cost (in years) of a marginal child. For example, if in our experiment,
age-specic fertility of women aged 25-29 drops from 0.26 to 0.21 (as it does in our base case
scenario of a decline in the TFR of 1.0 in Nigeria), and if the labor market time cost of a
marginal child is one year, then labor force participation for women in this age group would
rise by 5 percentage points.11
There only remains the question of choosing the base case parameter value for the
time cost of children. In the Cebu data used by Tiefenthaler, weekly labor market hours
fall from 10.4 prenatally to 5.0 at two months, 6.6 at six months, and 9.5 at 14 months for
women who have other children aged 0-5 in the household; and from 13.1 prenatally to 7.6
at two months, 11.3 at six months, and 13.8 at 14 months for those with both children aged
0-5 and 6-17 in the household. Crudely interpolating these data, and allowing for an almost
total cessation of labor market activity in the rst month after delivery, hours averaged over
10Because of heterogeneity in completed fertility, a reduction in the TFR from three to two will not mean
that all children not born would have been parity three. Instead, some would have been higher parity, while
others would have been rst or second children. Thus, our method will understate the increase in labor input
that results from such a reduction in fertility.
11Although it might seem problematic to \charge" the entire time cost of a child to the mother in the
year of the child's birth, we do not view this as too distortionary of reality for two reasons. First, time
costs of child-rearing are indeed concentrated in the rst years of life. Second, because we are considering an
age-specic fertility schedule that assigns a fractional number of births per year to each woman, the pattern
of labor force increase that is generated by our method will look similar to what would result if each birth
reduced labor force participation over a longer period of time. It is true, however, that our method may
slightly front-load the eect of lower fertility on labor force participation, both because we ignore child-
rearing costs in later years and also because we apply our marginal rate to all births, whereas higher order
births are concentrated at older ages.
15Age 2005 Nigeria 2005 Nigeria Reduce Increase Reduce Increase
Male Female TFR by 1 Factor TFR to 2.41 Factor
15-19 25.9% 11.8% 13.0% 1.101 15.3% 1.293
20-24 59.9% 28.1% 30.2% 1.074 34.1% 1.215
25-29 90.3% 39.4% 41.8% 1.062 46.5% 1.179
30-34 97.7% 41.6% 43.8% 1.052 47.9% 1.150
35-39 98.9% 51.6% 53.1% 1.028 55.8% 1.082
40-44 98.8% 57.1% 57.7% 1.010 58.7% 1.029
45-49 99.2% 67.0% 67.1% 1.002 67.4% 1.006
50-54 97.9% 69.3% 69.3% 1.000 69.3% 1.000
55-59 97.6% 60.9% 60.9% 1.000 60.9% 1.000
60-64 78.5% 42.1% 42.1% 1.000 42.1% 1.000
Table 1: The Labor Supply Response
the rst year are reduced roughly 5 per week in the rst group and 3 per week for the second
group. Weekly labor market hours for men in the same households do not change much in
response to a birth, and are equal to roughly 40. So, in this data, women in these two groups
lose, say 0.125 or 0.075 years of full-time equivalent labor market input in the rst year after
the birth of a marginal child. The complete or nearly complete recovery of labor hours by
14 months after delivery suggests that the decrement in subsequent years should be very
small. On the other hand, there are a good number of these years. Further, we have data on
neither the eciency loss by women with small children who are working, nor any long-term
health consequences of multiple pregnancies that might impede labor input for many years.
As a rough guess for our base case parameterization, we specify a labor market time cost of
1/2 year per marginal child.12
Table 1 shows the age-specic labor force participation rate (LFPR) for Nigerian
women in 2005 and the implied levels of LFPR if the TFR were reduced by one, and also if
the TFR were equal to 2.41 (which is the UN median forecast for 2050), using our base case
value of the time cost of a marginal child. For comparison, we also show the age-specic
LFPR for men.
12Bloom et al. (2009) examine the eects of fertility decline on female labor force participation in cross-
country data, using changes in abortion laws as an instrument for fertility. They estimate the change in
the age-specic female labor force participation that results from a decrease in the TFR of one. Taking
the weighted average by female population age structure, such a decline produces an increase of 13.51% in
total female labor force participation. Their estimates imply an average labor market cost per marginal
child of 4.4, which is far higher than the gure we use. However, the estimates in the Bloom et al. study
are identied by variation in high income countries, where baseline fertility levels are far lower and where
separation between home and workplace generally means that child-care and labor market input are mutually
exclusive.
163.5 Other Channels Not Covered
A simulation study such as ours is useful only to the extent that it covers all of the
quantitatively important channels by which a change in fertility aects the macroeconomy.
We have tried to keep our framework transparent and open, so that we (or someone else) can
add other channels if there is an appropriate basis. Here we discuss some potential channels
that we have not included, either because we think that they are of secondary quantitative
importance or because we did not have a basis for quantifying them.
3.5.1 Boserup Eects
There are several channels through which higher population density could positively aect
the level of income per capita. Boserup's work on agriculture stressed that, as population
rose, farmers were induced to switch to more intensive methods, which meant that the land
constraint did not end up lowering income per worker. A more generalized version of this
eect would be that higher population would induce technological progress more generally,
that is outside of agriculture, either out of \necessity," or because more people raises the
likelihood of someone having a productive idea (Jones, 1995). A completely dierent channel
by which population growth could raise output would be by allowing for better trade and
economies of scale in production. In the African context, it is often noted that long distances
and poor roads lead to an extremely high cost of trade.
We do not include any of these channels in our analysis for several reasons. Regarding
agriculture, some of the possibilities for intensication and substitution of other inputs for
land are already included in our production function approach. In particular, Section Six
(and the literature on which it draws) discusses evidence on the substitutability of inputs
for land. The intensity of cultivation varies enormously in sub-Saharan Africa, but the
Boserupian description in which fertile land can easily be shifted from fallow to continuous
cultivation seems inappropriate for most countries. Indeed, data show that over the last
decades cultivation in Africa has increasingly expanded onto marginally suitable land (see
Weil, 2008).
Regarding gains from scale as population rises, we are of two minds. On the one
hand, we agree that costly transport raises trade costs and leads to an inecient scale of
production in many African countries (Gollin and Rogerson, 2009). However, it is not clear
that population growth over the next several decades will lead to increases in rural population
density that would facilitate trade. Rather, Africa is rapidly urbanizing, implying that much













































































Figure 8: The Base Case Intervention Scenario
2008). It is hard to believe that mega cities such as Lagos do not already have sucient size
to achieve economies of scale in production.
On a more prosaic level, we were not able to nd quantitative estimates of the size
of Boserup eects that we could incorporate into our model.
3.5.2 Eects Through Health Improvements
Another channel through which fertility declines could possibly aect output is through
improvements in health. These could result from the same quality-quantity shift that we
model in the case of education. Ashraf et al. (2008) discuss how improvements in health
can be translated quantitatively into productive human capital. However, Joshi and Schultz
nd no eect of the fertility intervention in Matlab, Bangladesh on child health.
4 Basic Results
Figure 8 shows the paths of physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, labor
input per worker, income per worker, and income per capita in our simulation, using the base
case parameters discussed above. As in all the gures that follow, we show results relative












































































Figure 9: Income Per Capita Under Dierent Intervention Scenarios
The path of output per worker reects the dynamics of human and physical capital
per worker, labor input per worker, and land per worker (which we do not show, but which
can be inferred from Figure 8).
Figure 8 shows that, in our base case, the long-run eect of an exogenous reduction
of 1.0 in the TFR is to raise output per capita by 25.4 percent relative to the baseline
of no fertility intervention at a horizon of 50 years. At a 20-year horizon, the increase in
income per capita is 13.2 percent. As discussed below, the source of income gains varies
with the time horizon considered. In the early years of the simulation, the biggest gains
come through changes in the dependency ratio. Over the long run, the biggest eects come
through reduced pressure on xed resources such as land. Because the intervention that we
consider is a permanent reduction in fertility, and because fertility in our baseline remains
far above replacement indenitely, the scenario implies that the income gain from reduced
fertility continues to grow indenitely.
Figure 9 compares our base case with three alternative demographic scenarios: First,
an immediate reduction in TFR of 0.5, rather than the reduction of 1.0 in the base case;
second, the phased-in reduction of TFR by 1.0 discussed above; and third, a 15 year phased
reduction in TFR by 0.5 (we use this third scenario later in the paper for comparison with
the UN fertility forecasts, since it corresponds approximately to the dierence between the
UN medium and low fertility scenarios). Comparing the two dierent scenarios with an
19immediate reduction in fertility shows that the eect of fertility is roughly linear, at least in
the early stages of the simulation. A reduction in TFR of 1.0 yields increases in income per
capita that are slightly more than twice as big as those yielded by a reduction of 0.5. For
example, at a horizon of 50 years, the increase in income per capita is 11.7 percent in the
case of a reduction in TFR of 0.5, vs. 25.4 percent in the base case of a reduction of 1.0.
The gap grows at longer time horizons, as the dierence in population growth rates between
the two scenarios compounds. Comparing the base case scenario of an immediate reduction
in TFR to a 25-year phased-in reduction of the same size, the largest dierences are not
surprisingly in the early years. After 20 years, income per capita is 6.9 percent higher in the
case of a phased-in reduction in fertility, vs. 13.2 percent higher in the case of an immediate
reduction.
4.1 Component Channels
As discussed above, demographic change aects economic outcomes through a number of
channels, which may operate at dierent relative intensities at dierent time horizons. It is of
interest to decompose the eect of a fertility intervention into the parts that run through these
dierent channels. Some caution is necessary, however, because there are clearly interactions
among the dierent eects. In particular, the eect of fertility through any one channel will
depend on which other channels are operative. For example, the eect of increased labor
force participation of working-age adults will be larger or smaller, depending on the fraction
of the population made up of such adults. To address this problem, we do all of our analysis
of the eects of fertility through each of the dierent channels under the assumption that
all the other channels are operative { that is, we consider the results in our full simulation
relative to the case where one channel is deleted (an alternative would be to assume that no
other channels were operative).
We begin by looking at several channels individually. This allows us to perform an
analysis of the sensitivity of our results to assumptions about key parameters. We then do
a full decomposition, showing the relative importance of dierent channels at dierent time
horizons.
To gauge the importance of non-reproducible factors, we conduct a simulation in
which the level of land per worker follows the same path as it does in the baseline scenario.
In other words, we ignore the eect of lower fertility in preventing the land/labor ratio
from falling, while allowing for all the other economic eects of fertility decline. Figure 10
compares the path of output per capita in this scenario to the base case. The gure illustrates











































































Figure 10: The Eect of the Land-Labor Ratio on Income Per Capita
horizons. For the rst 35 years following the shock to fertility, the path of income per capita
when the Malthus eect is suppressed looks only slightly dierent than when the eect is
present (for the rst 15 of these years, this is mechanically true because the ratio of land to
labor has not changed, except for the small eect from changes in the supply of labor due
to the childcare and life-cycle labor supply channels). On the other hand, by about 70 years
following the shock to fertility, all other sources of growth in income per capita (relative to
the baseline) have petered out, and it is only the Malthus eect that produces continuing
growth (recall that, in our alternative scenario, the growth rate of population is permanently
lower than in the baseline).
We conduct a similar exercise to look at the importance of the capital-shallowing
channel. Specically, we construct a scenario in which the level of physical capital per
worker is the same following a shock to fertility as it is in the baseline case. The result is
shown in Figure 11. As with the Malthus eect, for the rst 15 years following the shock,
suppressing the Solow eect makes no dierence to the level of income per capita because
the number of workers does not dier between the baseline and alternative cases. Between
year 20 and year 65, the Solow channel is at its strongest. At year 65, output per capita is
18.1 percent above baseline when the Solow eect is suppressed, compared to 27.7 percent











































































Figure 11: The Eect of the Capital-Labor Ratio on Income Per Capita
Figure 12 shows the dependency eect, comparing the base case to the case where
the dependency ratio remains xed at its pre-shock steady-state level over time. Here, not
surprisingly, the phase in of the eect is almost immediate. Fifteen years after the reduction
in fertility, income per capita is only 4.5 percent above baseline when the dependency eect
is suppressed, vs. 10.3 percent above baseline when the eect is present. By year 50, the
increase in income per capita is 11.3 percentage points higher in the base case than when
the dependency eect is suppressed. From this point onward, the dierence between the two
paths is roughly constant.
Figure 13 looks at the experience channel. We compare the base case to the case
where the experience eect is shut down (by assuming that the return to experience is zero).
As the gure shows, the experience eect is not of great import. For example, at a 50 year
horizon, the increase in output per capita is 1.4 percentage points lower when the experience
eect is suppressed than in the base case. The reason that this eect is so small may be that,
in our simulation, even with a reduction in TFR, the labor force remains incredibly young.
Simulations that looked at more slowly growing populations might nd a bigger eect. It
is also interesting to note that, in the periods immediately following the shock to fertility,
output per capita is actually slightly higher in the case where there is no experience eect
than in the base case. This is because the increase in eective labor that results from a
































































































































































































































Medium Returns (Base Case) High Returns Low Returns No Returns to Schooling
Figure 14: The Eect of Returns to Schooling on Income Per Capita
In Figure 14, we vary the amount of extra human capital that is produced by an
additional year of schooling. As discussed above, our base case assumption is that the
return to education is 10.1 percent per year of schooling, which is consistent with standard
estimates if initial schooling is between 5 and 8 years. In the gure, we show alternative
paths for two dierent levels of returns to education (13.4 percent and 6.8 percent, which
are consistent with schooling less than ve years and 9+ years, using the estimates of Hall
and Jones) as well as a return of zero, which shuts down this channel completely. The gure
shows that schooling plays an appreciable role in determining the economic eects from
reduced fertility. At a horizon of 50 years, for example, output per capita is 19.2 percent
above baseline in the scenario where the return to schooling is zero (which is the same as
if there were no increase in schooling), vs. 25.4 percent higher in the base case scenario.
Thus, roughly speaking, schooling accounts for one quarter of the income gain from reduced
fertility at this time horizon.
As would be expected, the eect of higher schooling due to reduced fertility phases
in as the cohorts which received the additional schooling enter the labor force and replace
those which did not. Thus, for the rst 15 years after the shock to fertility, this channel
contributes little to higher income.
Figure 15 examines the childcare channel. We consider variations in the parameter











































































Figure 15: The Eect of Reduced Childcare on Income Per Capita
per capita using our base case assumption of a cost per marginal child of 0.5 years (of labor
market input) to alternatives of 1.0 and zero. The channel turns out to be surprisingly weak.
At a horizon of 15 years, for example, income per capita is 10.3 percent above baseline when
the marginal cost of a child is at its base case value of 0.5, vs. 11.1 percent above baseline
when the marginal cost of a child is 1.0, and 9.5 percent above baseline when the marginal
cost of a child is zero.
Finally, Figure 16 shows the life-cycle labor supply eect. We consider the base case
parameterization of our model to the case where labor force participation rates are constant
across age groups. Like the experience channel, the life-cycle labor supply channel has a
modest eect on income per capita. After a horizon of 50 years, income per capita is only
2 percentage points lower without the life-cycle labor supply eect than in the base case.
This channel is also similar to the experience channel in that, in the short run, output per
capita is slightly higher without the life-cycle labor supply eect. Again, this is because the
increase in labor supply from a reduction in fertility is initially concentrated among younger











































































Figure 16: The Eect of Age-Specic Labor Force Participation on Income Per Capita
4.2 Decomposition of Channels
Figure 17 presents a full decomposition of the fraction of the gain in income per capita at
each point in time that is due to the dierent channels we study. Because of interactions
among the dierent channels, the individual channel eects that we study above do not sum
to the total eect of a decline in fertility on income per capita. To do a decomposition of
the fraction of the gain in income per capita that is due to each channel, we thus proceed
as follows. As above, we calculate the importance of individual channels by comparing the
level of income per capita in each year in our base case to the level of income per capita
when the channel is suppressed. For each year, we then add up these individual eects to
get a proxy for the total eect that ignores interactions. Finally, we divide the individual
eects by the proxy for the total, to produce a share of the total income gain due to each
eect at each time horizon.
The gure shows that the dependency eect is by far the dominant channel in the short
run, explaining roughly 90 percent of the income gain in the rst 15 years of the simulation,
and only falling below 40 percent of the total after 40 years. The childcare eect, which is
conceptually very similar to the dependency eect, has a somewhat comparable trajectory,
although at a much lower level. At a horizon of 50 years, the four dominant eects are





























































































Fixed Factor Capital Shallowing Dependency Experience
Schooling Childcare Life‐cycle LFP
Figure 17: Decomposition of the Gain in Income Per Capita by Channel
percent of the total), and Malthus (10.5 percent). At a horizon of 100 years, the same
four eects are dominant, but in a dierent order: Solow (26.3 percent), dependency (25.5
percent), Malthus (22.2 percent), and schooling (15.5 percent).
5 Alternative Models of Investment
5.1 Age-Specic Saving Rates
Discussions of the \demographic dividend" from reduced population growth, such as Bloom
and Williamson (1998), often stress the benets to national saving from having a large
fraction of the population in its working years. In addition to raising income directly by
lowering the dependency ratio, the capital accumulation from this extra saving can result in
an increase in output per worker. In this section, we explore incorporating such eects into
our model.
One way to incorporate a demographic eect on national savings would be to combine
data on age-specic saving rates with the age structure of the population generated in
our simulations. Poterba (1994) presents data on age-specic saving rates in a number of
developed countries. However, such data are generally not available for developing countries,








































Figure 18: The Economic Life Cycle in Nigeria, 2004
example, Deaton (1992) calculates household consumption and income over the life cycle in
C^ ote d'Ivoire, and nds no clear relationship between age and saving, consumption, or even
income. Beyond this lack of data, there is a theoretical problem in looking at age-specic
saving rates. Weil (1994) points out that data on household saving does not take into account
the externality eects across generations via support of children and the aged, bequests, and
other transfers. As the age structure of the population changes, so do these intergenerational
ows.
An alternative to looking at age-specic saving rates is to look at age-specic income
and consumption. For example, Figure 18 shows the life-cycle patterns of consumption and
labor income for Nigeria in 2004. The data are from Soyibo et al. (2011). The gap between
consumption and labor income at any age are accounted for by transfers from other age
groups (either through family or institutions), non-labor income (such as rent on land or
capital), and additions to or subtractions from savings. The construction of data like these
for a large number of countries has been the goal of the National Transfer Accounts project
(see Lee and Mason, 2011).
It is clear from Figure 18 that a change in the population age structure, which
puts a higher fraction of the population in the mid-life years, where labor income exceeds
consumption, will expand society's budget constraint. Under such conditions, it will be
possible for there to be a higher level of consumption on average or for savings to rise, if
28not both. However, it is not immediately clear which of these should happen, or in what
proportion.
The piece of data missing from Figure 18 is non-labor income. To calculate this,
we start with data on the aggregate national saving rate in Nigeria in 2005, from the Penn
World Table (version 6.3), which was 8.55 percent. We impute total non-labor income such
that, given the consumption and labor income proles, as well as the age structure of the
population, we exactly match this saving rate. That is, dening x2005 as non-labor income
per capita in 2005, and ci and wi as consumption per capita and labor income per capita
respectively at age i,

















In the Nigerian data that we use as a benchmark, the level of x2005 is 28,147 Niara per
capita. This implies that non-labor income is 66 percent of labor income, which is remarkably
consistent with our model in which production is Cobb-Douglas and labor's share of national
income is 60 percent, capital's share is 30 percent, and land's share is 10 percent.
We can now look more explicitly at how changes in demographic structure aect
consumption possibilities. When the age structure of the population changes, labor income
per capita shifts, because people at dierent ages have dierent levels of labor income. In
addition, however, the consumption \needs" of the population also change. Although we
do not model this explicitly, we assume that the varying pattern of consumption by age
reects both changing biological needs for consumption over the course of the life cycle as
well as the arrangements by which consumption is divided up among dierent groups in
society. For simplicity, we assume that these relative levels of consumption do not change
as the age structure of the population changes, and we call them consumption needs, even
though this is not very good terminology. Slower population growth, by reducing the fraction
of the population made up of children, puts more people in ages that have higher relative
consumption { this eect undoes some of the benet of having more people earning labor
income.
Putting together the change in labor income and the change in consumption needs,
we can calculate the demographically-induced increase in available demographically-adjusted
income less demographically-adjusted consumption needs relative to a base year of 2005.13
We call this term the change in disposable income (DIt), which is again a slight abuse of





























The nal question is how this extra disposable income will be divided between saving and
consumption. In a na ve model, one might assume that needs-adjusted consumption remains
constant while the additional disposable income all goes into savings. This would indeed give
a very large demographic dividend in terms of capital accumulation, but we don't see it as
being very sensible. A more reasonable course is to invoke the idea of a marginal propensity
to consume, a standard component of many macroeconomic models.15
For such a commonly discussed parameter, there are very few available estimates of
the MPC. Using time series data for the United States, Feldstein (2009) estimates the MPC
out of real disposable income to be 0.70. In the Federal Reserve Board model for the United
States in the mid 1990s, the MPC out of labor income was 0.51 (Brayton and Tinsley, 1996).
Paxson (1992) looks at income variations caused by weather variability among farmers in
Thailand. She nds an MPC ranging between 0.17 and 0.27. Kan et al. (2011) look at the
consumption response to a voucher program in Taiwan, and calculate an MPC of 0.33. In
considering these estimates, it should be noted that they are all concerned with the MPC
out of short-run variation in income. The usual presumption is that the MPC to consume
out of short-run income is lower than the propensity to consume out of longer-term changes
in income. The demographic changes that we are considering are relatively long-term in
nature, and so a higher MPC is presumably appropriate. Indeed, if we are considering a
long run of a decade or more, the right assumption might be that the MPC is equal to the
average propensity to consume, that is, one minus the saving rate. This is the assumption
that is used in the previous part of the paper in which the saving rate is constant.
Given that we have very little idea what the right value of the MPC to use is, we
simply present our estimates for the full range of values, all the way from zero to one. Figure
14To model how non-labor income per capita changes in response to demographic change, we rely on the
Cobb-Douglas result that labor and non-labor shares of income are in a xed proportion. This implies that
non-labor income per capita is a constant fraction of labor income per capita.
15Yet another course would be to have a full scale intertemporal model of consumption with optimizing
agents. In the context of a developed country, Lim and Weil (2003) present such a model of the investment
response to demographic change. In the context of the current model, as discussed earlier, we have chosen not
to follow this path because we do not think that there are available models that do a good job of capturing












































































MPC = 0 MPC = 0.25 MPC = 0.5 MPC = 0.75 MPC = 1
Figure 19: The Eect of Age-Specic Saving on the Aggregate Saving Rate
19 shows the impact of the shifting age structure on the aggregate saving rate under the
dierent scenarios for MPC. Saving is shown relative to its pre-shock baseline value. In
the case where MPC is zero, the saving rate doubles within 30 years after the demographic
shock. Even an MPC of 0.5 leads to saving increasing by 40 percent within 30 years (and
pretty much remaining at that level permanently). It is interesting to note that, unlike the
analysis of Bloom and Williamson (1998), the demographic window of high savings does not
shut down after a few decades. The reason is that, as discussed earlier, the demographic
experiment that we are considering here is one in which fertility starts at such a high level
that there is only a very minor increase in old-age dependency that results from fertility
decline.
Figure 20 looks at the time paths of income per capita under the same set of as-
sumptions about the MPC. In the case where MPC is equal to zero, income per capita
in the fertility-reduction scenario is 25.3 percent higher at a horizon of 20 years and 64.3
percent higher at a horizon of 50 years than in the baseline. By contrast, in our base
case parameterization with a xed saving rate, output is 13.2 percent higher (relative to
baseline) at 20 years and 24.5 percent higher at 50 years. In other words, for this extreme
parameterization, there is an enormous savings eect on income. If the MPC is 1.0 (which
also strikes us as unreasonable), income rises by 11.2 percent (relative to baseline) after




































































































No Age Specific Saving (Base Case) With Age Specific Saving MPC = 0 No Age‐Specific Saving (Base Case) With Age‐Specific Saving, MPC = 0
With Age‐Specific Saving, MPC = 0.25 With Age‐Specific Saving, MPC = 0.5
With Age‐Specific Saving, MPC = 0.75 With Age‐Specific Saving, MPC = 1
Figure 20: The Eect of Age-Specic Saving on Income Per Capita
constant saving rate. The increase in income generated by the life-cycle savings eect is
roughly linear in the MPC. Overall, our analysis of age-specic savings does not produce
very concrete answers, but we are hopeful that the framework that we set up will be helpful
in clarifying future analyses of this issue.
5.2 International Capital Flows
An important part of our results is driven by the assumption of Solovian saving. It is possible
to adjust this assumption in a straightforward way even without building a life-cycle savings
model, simply by assuming that the economy is open to international capital ows that
equalize the return to capital around the world, at least up to a country xed eect.16
Figures 21 (capital per worker) and 22 (income per capita) show that allowing for
capital ows (assuming a xed world interest rate) has relatively little eect on the behavior
of income, although it does have a larger eect on the capital stock. With an open economy,
the capital stock rises somewhat faster in response to a fertility reduction because of the
increase in labor supply from reduced childcare, as well as the increase in human capital
from schooling as school-age cohorts at the time of the intervention start joining the labor
16Caselli and Feyrer (2007) make a strong case that marginal products of capital are almost completely
























































































































































Figure 22: The Eect of International Capital Flows on Income Per Capita
33force, both of which produce a nascent rise in the marginal product of capital; in contrast,
in the base case, capital accumulates rather slowly as income rises. Thus, capital per worker
is higher in the open economy case than in the base case for the rst 25 years. In the long
run, capital per worker is higher in the base case than in the open economy case because
slower labor force growth drives down the marginal product of capital, which in the open
economy leads to a capital outow.17 The dierence in output per capita between the base
case of Solow savings and the case with perfectly open capital markets is surprisingly small
{ never more than a couple of percentage points in the rst 50 years of the simulation.
6 The Role of Land in the Production Function
Our base case treatment of land involved assuming both a particular functional form (Cobb-
Douglas, in other words, unit elasticity of substitution) and a particular exponent on land
in the production function. In this section, we relax both of these assumptions. We adopt
a CES production function in which we can specify an elasticity of substitution between


















where  is the elasticity of substitution. If the xed factor is paid its marginal product, then
















If the elasticity of substitution is not unity, the xed factor's share of national income will vary
as physical capital and eective labor are accumulated, population grows, and technology
improves. For example, if  > 1, so that other factors can substitute for the xed factor,
then the xed factor's share of income will decline over time. Thus, one should be able to
learn about the elasticity of substitution, at least in a gross sense, by observing how the
income share of the xed factor changes over time, as A, K, and H accumulate.
17We simulate international capital ows in the following manner. Prior to the shock, capital accumulates
in the usual closed-economy Solovian fashion. Note that this is equivalent to assuming that the economy is
open to international capital ows, but has a domestic saving rate such that there is no inow or outow in
the pre-shock steady state. In other words, the marginal product of domestic capital in the pre-shock steady
state is equal to the xed world interest rate. Once the shock is applied, however, capital accumulates in
such a fashion as to maintain its pre-shock steady-state marginal product over time.
34Figure 23: Fixed-Factor Income Share and Output Per Worker Across Countries
Figure 23 shows data for doing such an analysis. The horizontal axis measures
output per worker. The data on the vertical axis is an estimate of the income share of
non-reproducible factors of production, from Caselli and Feyrer (2007).18 The Caselli and
Feyrer estimates are in turn built on data from the World Bank (2005) on the values of
physical capital, crop land, pasture land, and subsoil resources. As the gure shows, the
share of natural resources in total income in many developing countries is often in excess of
30 percent.
Using data like this, Weil and Wilde (2009) present estimates of the elasticity of
substitution between natural resources and other inputs into production. Their estimate is
in the neighborhood of two, which is consistent with the earlier estimate of Nordhaus and
Tobin (1972), looking at US data. However, all of these estimates are fairly imprecise. In
addition, the elasticity of substitution will vary with the resource in question. For example,
in developing countries with a large natural resource sector that is eectively detached from
the rest of the economy (for example, oshore oil wells), the elasticity of substitution between
natural resources and other inputs is innity.
18Specically, we use w k, where the former is the income share of all non-human factors and the latter
is the share of reproducible capital. Weil and Wilde (2009) provide an alternative measure of the natural















































































Figure 24: The Eect of Land Share on Income Per Capita
The production function can be re-written to show how total output compares at two
points in time, as the quantities of physical capital and eective labor change along with the




















To do this comparison, one does not need to know the quantity of the xed factor X or the
parameter a, but only the income share of the xed factor at a point in time, the elasticity
of substitution, and the growth of the inputs into production, all of which we were already
measuring. We use a value of  = 1
3, which is consistent with our earlier parameterization
of giving capital an exponent of 0.3 when the land share is 10 percent.
Figure 24 shows how the results of the model are altered when the income share of
land is increased from 10 percent to 20 and 30 percent. There are signicant dierences
between the three simulations in GDP per capita at long horizons following the shock. In
the long run, as expected, a higher land share means that the gains from reduced population
growth are larger. Surprisingly, however, for the rst 50 years of the simulation, there is little
dierence in the income gain in simulations using dierent land shares. The explanation is













































































Figure 25: The Eect of Land Substitutability on Income Per Capita
gains in human capital and labor supply (due to increased schooling and reduced childcare)
that result from slower population growth.
Figure 25 shows how varying the elasticity parameter  inuences our ndings by
comparing our base case scenario with results obtained under  = 0:75, where land is
more complementary than in the Cobb-Douglas case, and under  = 2, where land is
more substitutable. Intuitively, the greater this substitutability, the less severe will be the
consequences of increased population pressure on the xed factor, and thus the smaller will
be the income gains from lower fertility. At very long time horizons, this prediction is borne
out, but as in the case of varying the land share, dierences among the scenarios in the rst
50 years of the simulation are minimal.
7 Applying the Model to UN Population Projections
The analysis thus far was conducted using a very stylized demographic scenario, modeled
loosely on Nigeria but departing from reality in a number of important ways. In particular,
we took current Nigerian fertility and mortality rates as a starting point, assuming in our
baseline projection that these vital rates would stay constant indenitely. This constancy of
fertility is at odds with all projections that we know of, which say that fertility will decline.
We also assumed that, in our intervention scenario, the TFR dropped instantly by 1.0 and
37then stayed constant thereafter { a somewhat unrealistic path as well. Finally, for the initial
age structure of the population, we used the stable population implied by current vital rates,
which is somewhat dierent than the actual age structure of the Nigerian population.
The benet of this high degree of stylization was that it allowed us to more precisely
analyze the dierent channels by which a fertility intervention aected the economy, and
in particular the time horizons at which these channels assumed greater relative import.
Further, because we were interested in the eect of an intervention relative to a baseline
path, our belief was that the slightly unrealistic nature of the baseline path would not have
a rst-order eect on our conclusions.
In this section, we examine a more realistic baseline and intervention scenario. Specif-
ically, we take as our baseline the UN medium fertility demographic projection, and as our
alternative the UN low fertility demographic projection. Figure 26 shows the paths of the
total fertility rate in the two scenarios. The medium variant has the TFR declining rapidly
at rst, and then with some slowdown, from 5.32 in 2005-10 to 3.27 in 2025-30, and 2.41
in 2045-50. The fertility in the low variant is the same as in the medium variant, except
for a xed dierence in the TFR. More specically, it has the same fertility as the medium
variant in 2005-10, and then diers from the medium variant by a TFR of 0.25 in 2010-15,
then by 0.4 in 2015-20, and by a xed TFR of 0.5 thereafter (for example, the TFR in the
low variant for 2045-2050 is 1.91, compared with 2.41 for the medium variant). The two
scenarios feature the same future paths of age-specic mortality. In addition, we take the
current age distribution of the population as our starting point.
Figure 27 show the paths of total population in the two scenarios. Total population
in the low variant is 4.9 percent lower than the medium variant at a horizon of 2030, and
12.0 percent lower in 2050.
Figure 28, analogous to Figure 8 above, shows the paths of income per capita, income
per worker, physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, and also labor input per
worker in the alternative scenario (low fertility variant) relative to the baseline (medium
fertility variant). In the year 2055, which is 40 years after the two fertility paths diverged,
income per capita is 12.1 percent higher in the lower fertility scenario than in the medium
fertility scenario. That gure rises to 19.0 percent by the year 2100, assuming that the gap
in fertility remains constant.
Finally, Figure 29 shows a decomposition of the dierent channels through which
income per capita in the alternative scenario diers from the baseline. As in our more stylized
analysis above, the dependency eect, and to a lesser extent the labor supply eects, are
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Figure 30: The Time Paths of the Gain in Income Per Capita in the UN Exercise vs. a
Comparable \Stable Population" Exercise
fertility is spread out over several years, rather than happening instantly as in our earlier
analysis, the dependency eect remains the dominant channel for a longer period of time. It
only falls below half of the total eect on income per capita in the year 2045.
Having begun this section by pointing out the extent to which our stylized example in
the rest of the paper diered from the messy reality of actual changes in fertility, it is worth
pointing out that our analysis of a more realistic demographic scenario leads to results that
do not dier much from the stylized case. The UN experiment is of a reduction in TFR of
0.5, phased in over a period of 15 years, relative to a baseline of changing fertility, while our
stylized example was of an instant change in the TFR of 1.0 relative to a baseline of constant
fertility. In order to compare the two experiments more precisely, we examine the change in
income per capita which results from a decline in the TFR of 0.5 phased in over 15 years
in our stylized exercise against the results from the UN exercise. The results are shown in
Figure 30. Roughly speaking, the results from the UN exercise look similar to those from
the stylized exercise. Income per capita is 11.1 percent higher than baseline after 50 years,
whereas it is 14.2 percent higher in the UN experiment at the same time horizon (2060). In
addition, Figure 31 shows the channel decomposition for the stylized exercise. Comparing
the results from Figure 31 with the results from the UN exercise in Figure 29, it is clear that
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Figure 31: Decomposition of the Income Gain by Channel in the UN-Comparable \Stable
Population" Exercise
8 Conclusion
Using a simulation model, we explore the economic eects of an exogenous change in
population fertility. The model allows for eects that run through congestion of xed
factors (Malthus eect), capital shallowing (Solow eect), changes in the ratio of workers
to dependents (dependency eect), changes in the average experience of the population
(experience eect), changes in the saving rate (life-cycle saving eect), changes in the labor
supply of working-age adults (life-cycle labor supply and childcare eects), and changes in
the average level of schooling (child-quality eect). Our simulation model is parameterized
using a combination of microeconomic estimates of the eect of fertility changes on labor
supply and schooling, data on demographics in developing countries, aggregate measures
of the natural resource share in national income, and standard components of quantitative
macroeconomic theory. The paper discusses how variations in the parameterization of the
economic environment aect our results.
For a base case set of parameters, we nd that an immediate decline in the TFR of
1.0 will raise output per capita by approximately 13.2 percent at a horizon of 20 years, and
by 25.4 percent at a horizon of 50 years. The dependency eect (and to a lesser extent the
labor supply eects) are the dominant channels by which reduced fertility aects income per
42capita in the short run (in the rst quarter century after a fertility reduction). At a horizon
of 50 years, the four dominant eects are dependency (34.7 percent of the total), Solow (22.9
percent of the total), schooling (18.9 percent of the total) and Malthus (10.5 percent). In
the very long run, the Malthus eect is the dominant channel, followed in importance by the
Solow eect.
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